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State v. C. Dean Larsen, Case No. 930286

Dear Judges:
I am writing pursuant to Rule 24 (j) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure to advise the Court of the
opinion of the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Larsen, 865
P.2d 1335 (Utah 1993) (copy enclosed). Pages 1357 through
13 6 0 of this case are relevant to an argument made on page
42 of defendant's brief on appeal.
Oral argument in this case is scheduled for
tomorrow, April 19, 1994, at 9:00 a.m.
I apologize that
this letter was not more timely.
Yours very truly,

[IC VOROS, J R .

distant Attorney General
jm

enclosure
copy: Larry R. Keller, Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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STATE v. LARSEN
Cite at 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993)

We have observed that under the more
stringent requirements of service of process
under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 4, it is
not required that a plaintiff exhaust all possibilities as a means of finding and serving a
defendant, only that the plaintiff exercise
reasonable diligence in good faith.10 The Bar
has met this requirement
[41 We have also previously determined
that in disbarment proceedings, adherence to
minimum due process requirements includes
notice of a hearing.11 On December 6, 1991,
a notice of hearing set for March 2,1992, was
sent by certified mail to Schwenke's address
as shown on the official roster of attorneys of
the Bar and to the Las Vegas address.
Schwenke appeared at the sanctions hearing
and admitted that he received notice of the
hearing on February 6> 1992; at the Las
Vegas residence.
Between the time
Schwenke received the notice of hearing and
the date of the hearing, he neither contacted
the Bar nor filed an answer to the formal
complaint
At the sanctions hearing,
Schwenke cross-examined witnesses called
by the Bar and testified in his defense as to
the charges set forth in the formal complaint
We accordingly conclude that Schwenke
was properly served with the summons and
formal complaint on December 4, 1990, and
that all subsequent documents were, also
properly served, thereby affording adequate
notice and opportunity to respond to the
charges leveled against him. Although
Schwenke was in fact in default, he was
nevertheless afforded a full-scale hearing on
the merits of the allegations against him.
We have duly considered Schwenke's other
arguments and find them to be without merit
[5] The order of disbarment and the payment of restitution is affirmed.
HOWE, A.C.J., and STEWART,
DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff
and Respondent,

C. Dean LARSEN, Defendant
and Petitioner.
No. 920114.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Dec. 17, 1993.

Defendant was convicted in the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, Leonard
H. Russon, J., of 18 counts of criminal securities fraud. Defendant appealed. The Court
of Appeals, 828 P.2d 487, affirmed. On defendant's petition for writ of certiorari, the
Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held that:
(1) requirement that defendant act willfully
did not require proof of intent to deceive,
manipulate or defraud; (2) trial court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting security expert's testimony; (3) security expert's use of
word "material" was not improper instruction
to jury on law, and (4) if expert's testimony
couched in terms of materiality was error,
error was harmless.
Affirmed.

1. Criminal Law <s»1134(3)
Interpretation of statute is question of
law and is reviewed for correctness.
2. Statutes $»188
When faced with question of statutory
construction, Supreme Court first examines
plain language of statute.
3. Securities Regulation $s>323
Statute requiring that individual act
"willfully" to be criminally liable for securities fraud does not require "scienter," the

10. Downey State Bank v Major-Blakeney Corpt 11.
545 P2d 507, 509 (Utah 1976).

Schwenke, 849 ?2d at 576
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intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud.
U.CA1953, 61-1-1(2), 61-1-21.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and definitions.
4. Criminal Law G»20
To act "willfully" for purposes of criminal responsibility means to act deliberately
and purposefully, as distinguished from
merely accidently or inadvertently, willful,
when applied to intent with which act is done
or omitted, implies willingness to commit act,
but does not require intent to violate law or
to injure another or acquire any advantage.
U.OA.1953, 76-2-103.
5. Criminal Law <S»469.2, 1153(1)
Trial court has wide discretion in determining admissibility of expert testimony, and
such decisions are reviewed under abuse of
discretion: standard.
6. Criminal Law ®=>1147 ,
Under abuse of discretion standard, Sur«
preme Court will not reverse trial court unless decision exceeds limits of reasonability.
7. Criminal Law ^»469.1
Under rule governing admissibility and
limits of expert testimony, question that
must be posed prior to admission of any
expert evidence is whether on balance evidence will be helpful to finder of fact Rules
of Evid., Rule 702.
8. Criminal Law <S»471
In determining helpfulness of expert testimony, trial court must first decide whether
subject is within knowledge or experience of
average individual; it is not necessary that
subject of testimony be so,erudite or arcane
that jurors could not possibly understand it
without aid of expert testimony, nor is it
required that subject be beyond comprehension of each and every juror. Rules of Evid.,
Rule 702.
9. Criminal Law <8»476.3
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that expert testimony in securi-

ties fraud prosecution would be helpful to
jury, where expert expressed opinion that
some of material that defendant had omitted
from securities documents could have been
important or significant to investor, technical nature of securities was not within knowledge of average layman or subject within
common experience. Rules of Evid., Rule
702; U.CJU953, 61-1-1(2), 61-1-21.
10. Criminal Law e»469.3
Securities expert's use of word "material" during testimony was not improper instruction to jury on law in securities fraud
prosecution; although statute under wThich
defendant was prosecuted required finding
that information not disclosed was "material," testimony when read in context seemed
to use word "material" as synonym for "important"' U.C.A.1953, 61-1-1(2), 61-1-21;
Rules of Evid., Rule 702.
11. Criminal Law <S»470(1)
Insofar as expert's testimony expressed
opinion as to ultimate issue, it was not objectionable solely on that basis. Rules of Evid.,
Rule 704.
12. Criminal Law <3»470(1)
Expert testimony is not inadmissible
simply because it expresses opinion xm ultimate issue. Rules of Evid., Rule 704.
13. Criminal Law <S»469
Integral element of rule governing admission of expert testimony is balancing of
probativeness of evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice. Rules of Evid.^
Rule 702.
14. Criminal Law <S»1169.5(2)
Even if admission of securities expert's
testimony couched in terms of materiality
was error, error was harmless; trial court
correctly admonished jury as to relative roles
of expert testimony and opinion evidence and
instructed jury to accord no unusual deference to expert's opinions, and gave careful
instructions regarding legal definition and
requirements of term "material" as used in

STATE •. LARSEN
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statute. U.C.A.1953, 61-1-1(2), 61-1-21;
Rules of Evid., Rule 704.

R. Paul Van Dam, Atty. Gen., David B.
Thompson, Asst Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City,
for plaintiff and respondent
Larry R. Keller, John T. Nielsen, David L.
Arlington, Joel G. Momberger, Jon E. Waddoups, Melyssa D. Davidson, Salt Lake City,
for defendant and petitioner.
ON CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH
COURT OF APPEALS
ZIMMERMAN, Justice:

pany*s financial status, and related acts of
dishonesty. Larsen appealed to the court of
appeals, which affirmed his convictions. 828
P.2d at 496. We granted certiorari to consider his claims of legal error.
Larsen first asserts that the trial court
erroneously instructed the jury as to the
applicable law. He alleges that the trial
court improperly refused to give portions of
his proposed instructions concerning the elements of and defenses to criminal securities
fraud. The omitted portions, in substance,
would have instructed the jury that to be
guilty of a. criminal violation of section 61-11(2), Larsen must have acted with the specific intent to defraud and that a representation
made "in good faith constitutes a complete
defense to a charge of securities fraud."

C. Dean Larsen petitioned for a writ of
certiorari, seeking review of a Utah Court of
[1] The propriety of the instructions givAppeals decision upholding the district
court's rulings on two issues relating to his en hinges on the correct interpretation of
conviction on eighteen counts of criminal se-' sections 61-1-1(2) and -21.* In particular,
curities fraud. Larsen contends that the tri- does a criminal violation of these sections
al court erred in refusing to instruct the jury require proof of an intent to defraud, deceive,
that the intent to defraud, deceive, or manip- or manipulate? The correct interpretation of
ulate is an element of a criminal violation of a statute is a question of law and is reviewed
sections 1(2) and 21 of the Utah Uniform for correctness. State v. James, 819 P.2d
Securities Act See Utah Code Ann. §§ 61- 781, 796 (Utah 1991); Ward n Richfield City,
1-1(2), -21. Larsen also complains that the 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990).
trial court erroneously allowed a State expert
to testify as to the "materiality" of informa[2,3] When faced with a question of stattion that Larsen allegedly had failed to dis- utory construction, this court first examines
close to investors. We affirm his convictions. the plain language of the statute. Schurtz v.
BMW ofN. Am, Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1112
The facts of this case are detailed in the
(Utah 1991); Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d
court of appeals' opinion in State v. Larsen,
497, 500 (Utah 1989) (per curiam). Section
828 P.2d 487,488-90 (Utah CtApp.1992). To
61-1-1(2) states in relevant part:
summarize, Larsen was charged with, and
convicted of, eighteen counts of securities
It is unlawful for any person, in connection
fraud under sections 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21
with the offer, sale, or purchase of any
of the Code. These convictions arose out of
security,, directly or indirectly to:
his actions while president of a real estate''
development company in which others had
(2) make any untrue statement of a mainvested Larsen's criminal acts included his
failure to inform investors of material inforterial fact o r to omit to state a material
mation related to the company, misrepresenfact necessary in order to make the statetations of material facts regarding the eomments made, in the light of the circum1. In this case, this court is concerned only with
the proper construction of a portion of section
61-1-1, specifically subsection 1(2) We therefore do not address the question of whether sub-

sections 1(1) and 1(3) require scienter Cf. Aaron v Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 446 U S. 680,
695-702, 100 S.Ct 1945, 1954-1959, 64 L.Ed.2d
611 (1980).
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"desire to engage in the conduct that cause[s]
the result" Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103.
Nothing in this definition requires scienter.3
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2) *, This section's, Moreover, a brief survey of the Code constandards govern both civil and criminal lia- firms that the Utah legislature knows how to
bility. To ascertain the elements of a crimi- require scienter, if it so desires, by including
nal violation, however, this section must be specific language to that effect See, e.g., idL
read in conjunction with section 61-1-21, §§ 23-20-27, 41-la-1319, 76-^-506.2, 76-10which specifies the requisite mental state and, 706 & +1006V
penalties for a criminal violation. Utah Code
Ann. § 61-1-21. Section 61-1-21 provides in
Failing to find support in the express
pertinent part:terms of the Code, Larsen suggests that the
Any person who willfully violates any pro- scienter requirement is an "independent elevision of this chapter [including section 61- ment" of the offense. Stated another way,
1-1(2)] .\. or who willfully violates any although it is not apparentfromthe language
rule or order under this chapter . . . shall of the provision, Larsen contends that we
upon conviction be fined not more than* should read the scienter requirement into the
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than three1 statute. We have rejected similar attempts
to engraft a judicially created intent requireyears, or both.
ment upon the plain language of a criminal
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (emphasis add- statute. E.g., State v. Delmotte, 665 P.2d
ed). The plain language of section 61-1-21 1314r 1315 (Utah 1983) (holding offense of
requires that to be liable for a criminal viola-, writing bad check does not require intent to
tion of section 61-1-1(2), the defendant must defraud). Perhaps more on point, other
have acted "willfully" in misstating or omit- states have rejected attempts to import;
ting material facts. Id. Larsen asks thi^ scienter into analogous securities-fraud statcourt to interpret "willfully" as requiring utes. See, e.g., People u Johnson* 213 CaL
"scienter," the intent to deceive, manipulate,- App.3d 1369, 262 Cal.Rptr. 366, 369 (CtApp.
or defraud, as defined by the United States- 1989); State v. Temby, 108 Wis.2d 521, 322
Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst* v. Hock* N.W.2d 522, 526 (CtApp.1982); This court
folder, 425 U.S. 185, 96 S.Ct. 1375, 47 will not affix new "independent requireL.Ed.2d 668 (1976), a.rule 10b-5 case.
ments" to an otherwise clear and constitutional statute.
[4] In determining whether we can, or
should, give "willfully" such a construction,
Although the language of the statute effecwe first look to £he statutory definition of tively disposes of the issue, Larsen asserts
"willful." The legislature has indicated that that this court should look beyond the plain,
a person acts willfully when it is his oi* her' language of the Utah Uniform Securities Act
stances under .which they are made, notmisleading.

2.

In 1963, the Utah legislature substantially
adopted the Uniform Securities Act, which had
been developed by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See
Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1 to -30; Uniform Securities Act, reprinted in Blue Sky Laws 1993
289-374 (1993). Sie generally Wallace R. Bennett, Securities Regulation in Utah: A Recap of
History and the New Uniform Act, 8 Utah L.Rev.
216, 227-28 (1963). The Uniform Act contains
an anti-fraud provision, section 101, modeled
after, and with language taken from, section
17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 and rule 10b5, which was promulgated pursuant to section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
See Uniform Securities Act § 101, cmt. .01; Blue
Sky Laws, at 295. The Utah legislature incorporated section 101 into the Utah Code as section

61-1-1 without significant modification. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 with Uniform^
Securities Act § 101.
3 . - To act willfully in this context means to act
deliberately and purposefully, as distinguished
from merely accidentally or inadvertently. Cf
United States v. Hairston, 819 F.2d 971, 974
(10th Cir.1987). Willful, when applied to the
intent with which an act is done or omitted,,
implies a willingness to commit the act, which,
in this case, is the misstatement or omission of a
material fact. Willful does not require an intent,
to violate the law or to injure another or acquire
any advantage, See generally State v. Tarzuin,
665 P.2d 582, 585 (Ariz.Ct.App.1983).
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to the legislative intent. Section 61-1-27 trf
the Code provides that Utah's Uniform Securities Act "may be construed so as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform th6
law of those states which enact it ^nd to
coordinate the interpretation and administration of this chapter with the related federal
regulation." Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-27.
Larsen asserts that this section was intended
to bind state judicial interpretations of
Utah's antifraud provisions to the United
States Supreme Court's interpretations of
similar federal securities provisions. Specifically, Larsen argues that the language similarities between section 61-1-1(2) and rule
10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), when viewed in light of the
intent requirement embodied in section 611-27, require this court to interpret Utah's
antifraud provision in conformity with .the
Supreme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 96 S.Ct. 1375, 47
L.Ed.2d 668 (1976). Hochfelder held, inter
alia, that "scienter," or an intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud, must be proved before civil liability can be imposed under rule
10b-5. See id, 425 U.S. at 187, 96 S.Ct at
1378, 47 L.Ed.2d at 674; Aaron v. Securities
& Exck < Coram V 446 U.S. 680, 692, 100
S.Ct. 1945, 1953, 64 L.Ed.2d 611 (1980).
Larsen's argument is facially legitimate and
requires response.
We first examine Hochfeldefs reasoning.
The issue before the Hochfelder court was
I

-17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.

5.

15 I J.S.CIl § 78j(b).

6

Section 17(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer
or sale of any securities by the use of any
means or instruments of transportation oi
communication in interstate commerce or b)
the use of the mails, directly of indirectly—
(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice
to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or propertyrby means of
any untrue statement of a material fact or any
omission to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or
course of business which operates or would

"whether a private cause of action for damages {would] lie under § 10(b) and Rule 10b5 in the absence of any allegation of 'scienter^—intent to-deceive, manipulate, or defraud." ~ Id The SEC promulgated rule
10b-54 pursuant to powers vested in it by
section 10(b)5 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 ("1934 Act"). Id at 195, 96 S.Ct at
1381, The Court ultimately determined that
scienter is required because the language of
section 10(b)—the statutory authority upon
which rule 10b-5 is grounded—implicitly limited the SEC's power to promulgate an implementing rule to one that required scienter. Id at 213-14, 96 S.Ct at 1390-91; see
also Aaron, 446 U.S. at 690, 100 S.Ct at
1952; 2 Thomas Lee Hazen, The Law of
Securities Regulation $ 13.4, at 81 (2d ed
1990).'In contrast to rule 10b-5, Utah's securities
fraud provision, section 61-1-1(2), does not
operate against a background of limiting
statutory authority. "The interpretation we
give to section 61-1-1(2) of the Utah Code is
therefore not circumscribed by the dispositive language of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act
In that respect, section 61-1-1(2) of the Code
atavistically resembles, not rule 10b-5, but
section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933,
which the Aaron Court declined to interpret
as requiring scienter.. 446 U.S. at 697, 100
S.Ct at 1956.* Because of this critical difference, Hochfelder is not particularly helpful in
interpreting Utah's analogue to rule 10b-5.7
operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
15 U.S.C.f 77q(a). T h e Supreme Court in Aaron stated "that the language of § 17(a) requires
scienter i finder § 17(a)(1), but not under
§ 17(a)(2) or § 17(a)(3)." 446 U.S. at 697. As
we are dealing here only with section 61-1-1(2)
of the Utah provision, which is analogous to
section 17(a)(2), we do not reach the question of
a scienter requirement vel non under section 6 1 1-1(1) or -1(3).
"1" Even if Hochfelder were directly on point, the
committee that promulgated the Uniform Securities Act has indicated that the Act, in most cases
including this one, was not intended to bind state
courts to related federal interpretations. See
Uniform Securities Act § 501 cmt. 3 (1985), reprinted in Blue Sky Laws 1993 428 (1993). In
1985, the committee specifically indicated that it
"did not intend that.state courts be bound to
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Further, even if we were to assume that
rule lQb-5 and section 61-1-1(2) are direct
parallels, as Larsen suggests, he fails to recognize that the Utah legislature has not required the courts to interpret the Utah Uni^
form Securities Act in lockstep with federal
decisions*. Section 61-1-27, on which Larsen
relies for his lockstep mandater seems to
make uniformity with other states ftiore important than uniformity with interpretations
of analogous federal statutes- See Utah
Code Ann. § 61-1-27. Section 61-1-27 provides that Utah's < Uniform Securities Act
"may be so construed as to effectuate its
general purpose to make uniform the law of
those states which enact it and to coordinatethe interpretation and administration of this
chapter with the related federal legislation*"..
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-27 (emphasis add-i
ed). Although the meaning of "coordinate"
as it relates to federal legislation is not entirely clear, the mandate "to make uniform"*
the law of the enacting states is unmistakable. Uniformity with a significant majority
of states is achieved only by a "no scienter"
construction of the provision. See Johnson,
213 Cal.App.3d 1369, 262 Cal.Rptr. at 369;
People v. Whitlow, 89 IU.2d 322, 60 IH.Dec.
587, 433 N.E.2d 629, 634, cert, denied, 459
U.S. 830, 103 S.Ct 68, 74 L.Ed.2d 68 (1982);
People v. Mitchell, 17S Mich.App. 83, 437
N.W.2d 304, 307 (CtApp.1989), appeal denied, 433 Mich, 895, 446 N.W.2d 830 (1990);
State v. Fries, 214 Neb. 874, 337 N.W.2d 398,
405 (1983); State v. Ross, 104 N.M. 23, 715
P.2d 471, 474 (CtApp.1986); State v. Cox, 17
Wash.App. 896, 566 P.2d 935, 938 (1977), cert
denied, 439 U.S. 823, 99 S.Ct 90, 58 L.Ed.2d
115 (1978); Temby, 322 N.W.2d at 526.
As a policy argument for his position, Larsen argues that without a scienter requirement section 61-1-1(2) raises the specter of
follow [Hochfelder] " Id To the extent that
Larsen relies on a perceived mandate in the
Uniform Securities Act favonng state adherence
to federal interpretations his analysis is lacking
in support
8. Because a finding of scienter is not a prerequisite to criminal liability under section 61-1-1(2),
the trial court properly refused to instruct the
jury that good faith is a complete, defense to

strict liability, or in other words, a fear that
accounting firms and other professionals will
be held liable for "good faith oversight" or
failure "to discover and disclose a material
fact" Larsen predicts that this threat of
strict liability will preclude "responsible individuals and entities" from providing securities services in the future. This argument
completely ignores the willfulness requirement of section 61-1-21, and misuses the
term "strict liability."
An individual must act willfully to be criminally liable under the statute. This means
that the prosecution must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the accused "desire[d]
to engage in the conduct or cause the result"
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103. This highly
culpable mental state is not consistent with
"strict liability," as that term is traditionally
used. See Black's Law Dictionary 1422 (6th
ed. 1990); 1 Wharton's Criminal Law § 23,
123 (15th ed. 1993). Further, a "no scienter"
reading of the statute will affect only those
professionals who willfully omit or misstate^
material facts. This result seems to be exactly what the legislature intended. If the
legislature had wanted scienter for perceived
public policy reasons, it could have included
that requirement. It did not, and we will
not*
Larsen's second challenge is based on his
claim that the trial court erred by allowing a
securities expert for the State, Sherwood
Cook,* to testify as to the "materiality" of
information Larsen allegedly had omitted
from securities-related documents. Larsen's
argument before this court is somewhat diffuse. Nevertheless, he appears to be asserting that the trial court should not have admitted Cook's expert testimony on materiality under Utah Rule of Evidence 702 because
the testimony purportedly expressed the "lecnminal liability Cf In re University Med Ctr,
973 F 2d 1065, 1087-88 (3d Cir 1992), Barnett v
United States, 594 F 2d 219, 222 (9th Cir 1979).
j

Look was introduced to the jury as a It inur
Utah securities regulation official and the top
secunues administrator in Nevada
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gal conclusion" that Larsen's omissions violated section 61-1-1(2), the statute prohibiting material omissions or misstatements.
[5,6] We first state the proper standard
of review. The trial court has wide discretion in determining the admissibility of expert testimony, and such decisions are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332 n. 1
(Utah 1991); Dixon v. Steimrt, 658 P.2d 591,
598 (Utah 1982); State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d
723, 726 (Utah 1982); see 2 Gregory P. Joseph & Stephen A. Saltzburg, Evidence m
America: The Federal Rules in the States
ch. 51, § 51.3, at 2 & n. 4 (1987) [hereinafter
Joseph and Saltzburg]; accord Wade v.
Haynes, 663 F.2d 778, 784 (8th Cir.1981),
affd, 461 U.S. 30, 103 S.Ct 1625, 75 L.Ed.2d
632 (1983). Under this standard, we will not
reverse unless the decision exceeds the limits
of reasonability. State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d
232, 239-40 (Utah 1992); Shurtleff v. Jay
Tuft & Co, 622 P.2d 1168, 1173 (Utah 1980).
[7] In general, the admissibility and limits of expert testimony are governed by rules
701 through 704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Rule 702 provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto
in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Utah R.Evid. 702. Under rule 702, the question that must be posed prior to the admission of any expert evidence is whether, "on
balance, the evidence will be helpful to the
finder of fact." State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d
388, 398 n. 8 (Utah 1989); see Dixon, 658
P.2d at 598.
10. Cook did not, as Larsen suggests, testify that
Larsen was guilty, nor did Cook testify that, as a
matter of law, the facts satisfied the legal standard of materiality.
11. Unlike Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 153
(Utah 1987), the present case does not involve
expert testimony regarding legal or factual issues
not before the court or jury The Ashton roitrt

[8] In determining "helpfulness/' the trial court must first decide whether the subject is within the knowledge or experience of
the average individual. Dixon, 658 P.2d at
597. It is not necessary that the subject of
the testimony be so erudite or arcane that
the jurors could not possibly understand it
without the aid of expert testimony, nor is it
a requirement that the subject be beyond the
comprehension of each and every juror. See
id
[91 Here, we agree with the court of appeals' statement that expert testimony may
be appropriate in "securities fraud cases because the technical nature of securities is not
within the knowledge of the average layman
or a subject within the common experience
and would help the jury understand the issues before them." Larsen, 828 P.2d at 49293. In his testimony, Cook was expressing
his opinion that some of the material that
Larsen had omitted from the securities documents could have been important or significant to an investor.10 We do not find that
the trial court abused its discretion in determining that such testimony would be helpful
to the jury. u
[10] Larsen claims that even if the subject of this testimony might have been beyond the experience of the average individual, Cook's testimony regarding materiality
was not "helpful* because it transgressed
into the area reserved for the jury by instructing the jury as to what legally constitutes material information. Larsen focuses
on Cook's occasional use of the term "material" during his expert testimony. Specifically,
Larsen argues that Cook could have given
his testimony without using the term "material" and that by using the term, he moved
from arguably admissible opinion evidence to
aa "inadmissible legal conclusion" because
upheld the trial court's exclusion of an attorney's
proposed testimony on the legal effect of a joint
tenant's transfer of property. Id. at 153. In
other words, the proposed testimony in Ashton
was intended solely to explain the applicable law,
which did not aid the jury in resolving the factual
disputes.
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the statute m question is framed in terms of
material information. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 61-1-1(2),

In the present case, the use of the term
"material" presents unique problems because
it has two possible referents. First, in ordinary parlance materiality means "important"
or "significant" Oxford American Dictionary 547 (1980). Used in this context, "material" signifies something that an individual
would want to know in making an important
decision. One could testify about this concept without using the term "material" by
stating that the information allegedly omitted
is important or significant Presumably,
such testimony, assuming it was otherwise
helpful and admissible, would not be objectionable as expressing a legal conclusion.
The second, and legal, usage of the term
"material" comes from the Utah statute under which Larsen was prosecuted and from
securities law in general. The law uses the
term "material" in defining what information
must legally be disclosed. Larsen's basic
claim is that when Cook used the disputed
term, the trial court was allowing him to tell
the jury that the omitted information legally
constituted material information within the
meaning of the statute, and Cook was thereby instructing the jury that Larsen was
guilty. Larsen suggests, in fact, that Cook's
testimony would have been proper if he had
used a word other than "material."
Cook certainly should have avoided employing the specific term "material." However, his limited use of that word, under the
circumstances, does not mandate the conclusion that he was improperly instructing the
jury on the law.
We think that Larsen's analysis, hanging
as it does on one word that has two almost
identical meanings, is unduly formalistic
The jury was charged with making the ultimate determination of whether the statements made or facts omitted by Larsen were
factually material, i.e.r whether they were
likely to influence a reasonable investor., Cf.
TSC Indus. Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S.
438, 450, 96 S.Ct 2126, 2132, 48 L.Ed.2d 757

(1976) ("[IJssue of materiality may be characterized as a mixed question of law and fact").
Given that "materiality" has a popular meaning bearing directly on the factual issue before the jury and that Cook's testimony,
when read in context, seems to use "material" as a synonym for "important," we do not
believe that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Cook's testimony.
111J Moreover, materiality, as it relates
to the importance of the omitted information,
was an "ultimate issue." Under Utah Rule
of Evidence 704, expert testimony is not
objectionable solely because it encompasses
the ultimate issue to be decided by the jury.
Rule 704 provides in pertinent part that "testimony in the form of an opinion or inference
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be
decided by the trier of fact" Utah R.Evid.
704. Larsen's semantic characterization of
Cooks testimony as a legal conclusion does
not, without more, move the testimony outside the scope of this ultimate-issue rule.
[12,13] Larsen correctly asserts that
rule 704 does not make expert testimony
admissible simply because it expresses an
opinion regarding an ultimate issue. By the
same token, however, rule 704 does not make
expert testimony inadmissible simply because it expresses an opinion on the ultimate
issue, as Larsen seems to suggest. See
Span, 819 P.2d at 332 n. 1. As one commentator noted, "Since the adoption of rule 704,
courts have generally not hesitated to follow
it and to permit expert testimony directly
concerning the critical issue before the trier
of fact" Joseph & Saltzburg, ch. 53, § 53.3,
at 2; see People v. Rivers, 727 P.2d 394, 400
(Colo.CtApp.1986) (holding that pathologist's
opinion testimony indicating attack occurred
in two stages is not improper because it
embraced an ultimate issue); see also United
States v. Cohen, 518 F.2d 727, 737 (2d Cir.)
(holding that trial court did not abuse it
discretion by admitting expert testimony on
the reach of the concepts of "underwriter"
and "materiality" in securities fraud case),
cert denied, 423 U.S. 926, 96 S Ct 270f 271f
46 L.Ed.2d 252 (1975)
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The bottom line is that the question of . HALL, CJ., and STEWART, J., having
materiality as it relates to the importance or -disqualified themselves, do not participate
significance of the omitted information is, at rfaerein; FREDERICK and ROKICH,
ieast on one level, a factual issue to be deter- District Judges, sat
-mined by the jury. Rule 704 permits Cook
'to express an opinion regarding the ultimate
-resolution of that disputed issue as long as
that testimony is otherwise admissible under
YSV
the rules of evidence. See Joseph & SaltsfeKYSi^Sg{/
burg, ch. 53, § 53.3, at 3. Under the circum-atances, we are not persuaded that the trial
-court abused its discretion in permitting
Cook's testimony.12
{14] Finally, even if the admission of
Cook's testimony couched in terms of materiality had been in error, Larsen has not con-vinced us that the error would .have been
.harmful. The trial court correctly admonished the jury as to the relative roles of
-expert testimony and opinion evidence and
instructed the jury to accord no unusual deference to an expert's opinions. The trial
court also gave careful instructions regarding
the legal definition and requirements of the
*term "material" as used in the statute. Tak<fen together, these instructions substantially
reduced whatever slight risk of confusion
•Cook's use of the term "material" might have
(engendered in the jury. Given the trial
court's adequate instructions to the jury, we
-find that if any error had occurred in admit.ting the expert testimony, it would have been
harmless.
The convictions are affirmed.
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J. DENNIS FREDERICK and JOHN A.
ROKICH, District Judges, concur.
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12. We do not suggest that the trial court must
allow expert testimony regarding materiality, especially testimony utilizing the term "material."
We simply hold that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion m allowing the limited testimony in
this case.
We also note that an integral element of a rule
702 determination to admit expert evidence is a
balancing of the probativeness of the evidence
against its potential for unfair prejudice. State v.
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 398 n 8 (Utah 1989)
This balancing mimics that under rule 403 and is
necessary to a determination of "helpfulness."
In the present case, Larsen did not specifically
object to the use of "material" on the ground

1that the probative value of the usage was subistantially outweighed by the potential for unfair
jprejudice or confusion of the issues. See Utah
]R.Evid 403. Larsen's objections, although cit}ing to rule 702, addressed only the contention
tthat materiality in general was not a proper
tsubject for expert testimony. Trial counsel must
tstate clearly and specifically all grounds for obj
jection.
See Utah R.Evid 103(a)(1). Inasmuch
, Larsen failed to assert a claim of prejudice at
as
t
the
trial court, that issue is not properly pretserved for appeal. If Larsen had made such an
*objection, it might have merited serious consideration by the trial court.
'

